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We study the eﬀe c t so fp r o g r e s s i v et a x e si nc o n v e n t i o n a le n d o g e n o u sg r o w t hm o d e l sa u g m e n t e d
to include heterogeneous households. In contrast to representative agent models with ﬂat-rate
taxes, this framework allows us to distinguish between marginal tax rates and the empirical proxies
that are typically used for these rates such as the share of tax revenue, or government expenditures,
in GDP. The analysis then illustrates how the endogenous nature of these proxy variables causes
them to be weakly correlated, or even increase, with economic growth. Our study, therefore, helps
explain why cross-country regressions have mostly failed to uncover the distortional growth eﬀects
of taxes. In fact, while past U.S. tax reforms appear to have contributed only small increases in per
capita GDP growth, our analysis nevertheless suggests that diﬀerences in tax codes across countries
explain a two and a half percent variation in cross-sectional growth rates. Finally, we show that
progressivity also introduces signiﬁcant lags in the eﬀects of tax changes on output growth.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E13, O23
Keywords: Economic Growth, Progressive Taxation, Heterogeneous Households
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
In contrast to the older neoclassical literature, endogenous growth models imply that gov-
ernment policy helps determine the rate of economic growth. Calibration of basic linear
growth setups to U.S. data initially showed that the growth eﬀects of ﬂat-rate taxes range
from negligible (Lucas [1990]) to very large (Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi [1993]). Stokey and
Rebelo (1995) showed that much of this variation depends on critical parameters, includ-
ing factor shares, depreciation rates, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. More
important, along with Jones (1995), they argued that U.S. time series data is at odds with
the notion that tax changes induce signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth. Speciﬁcally, the
dramatic increase in income taxation in the early 1940s would have been expected to de-
crease contemporaneously the U.S. per capita growth rate. But this did not appear to be
the case. At the same time, cross-country studies, including Levine and Renelt (1992) and
Levine and Zervos (1993), have generally been unable to conﬁrm any negative link between
government policy and output growth. Thus, both cross-country and time-series work has
suggested that long-run growth is mostly independent of ﬁscal policy.
In this paper, we illustrate how the endogeneity problem associated with standard proxies
for marginal tax rates can result in an apparent lack of correlation between growth and policy
in cross-sectional regressions. In addition, while our analysis indicates that the growth eﬀects
of tax changes have likely been small in the U.S., we ﬁnd that cross-country diﬀerences in
tax codes can explain more than a two and a half percent variation in growth rates.
We study the eﬀects of progressive taxation in conventional growth models augmented
to include heterogeneous households. In such frameworks, the tax code helps to determine
simultaneously the pre-tax income distribution and the rate of technical progress. Because
the pre-tax income distribution is endogenous, so too are income taxes collected and, con-
sequently, the share of government spending in output. Therefore, in contrast to a large
class of representative household frameworks with ﬂat-rate taxes, our models no longer im-
ply a necessarily decreasing relationship between the share of government expenditures and
economic growth across countries.
Of course, because cross-country marginal tax rates are not easily observable, one is
typically forced to use some share of government expenditures (or tax revenue) in GDP as a
proxy.1 To see why this can be particularly misleading given the models we study, consider
the consequences for an economy whose tax system becomes more progressive.
First, with marginal tax rates increasing for the rich relative to the poor, high-income
households have less incentive to accumulate both human and physical capital and, ulti-
1Regressing various measures of tax revenue on their tax base is also common (Koester and Koermendi
[1989], and Easterly and Rebelo [1993]).
3mately, may have lower pre-tax earnings in equilibrium.2 Hence, as the degree of tax pro-
gressivity increases, it is not clear that the share of tax revenue in GDP should rise; in fact,
it may even decline. Simultaneously, because more progressive tax systems are generally
more distortional (see Sarte [1997], and Castañeda, Diaz-Gimenez, Rios-Rull [1999]), they
are likely to be associated with lower economic growth ceteris paribus. Together, these two
endogenous outcomes imply that variations in progressivity across economies cause output
growth and the share of public expenditures in GDP to have either little or positive corre-
lation. This result summarizes precisely the empirical ﬁndings of Levine and Renelt (1992),
Levine and Zervos (1993), and Easterly and Rebelo (1993), among others. Furthermore, it
holds irrespective of whether government services play a productive role in production.
Over the past two decades, the marked reductions in top U.S. statutory tax rates have
paradoxically coincided with higher-income households’ bearing a greater share of the tax
burden. The models we present help explain these observations because lower statutory
progressivity leads to increased pre-tax income inequality that potentially oﬀsets the lower
statutory rates for richer households. In other words, with high-income households earning
more in relative terms, eﬀective progressivity — as captured by the actual degree of tax
concentration — can increase. The fact that U.S. income inequality has indeed consistently
risen over the past 20 years is now widely documented. Furthermore, when we calibrate
diﬀerences in tax codes to yield the observed degree of income inequality across countries,
we ﬁnd that variations in ﬁscal policy can explain more than a two and a half percent
diﬀerence in economic growth.
The explicit modeling of non-linear taxes also has important dynamic implications. Con-
sider, for instance, a closed economy where all factors of production are reproducible and
the technology is linear. This is in eﬀect the  framework. Because the marginal tax rate
increases in income in our environments, the after-tax rate of interest is now a function of
the composite capital good. Consequently, contrary to the original framework, a change in
tax policy will induce some transitional dynamics as the economy moves from one balanced
growth path to another (see Yamarik [2001]).
In models calibrated to U.S. data, we ﬁnd that the wave of tax reforms that began in
the early 1980s had small but protracted eﬀects on per capita GDP growth. Thus, the
long transition dynamics between balanced growth paths can only increase the diﬃculty
of identifying growth eﬀects of tax changes in time series data. Furthermore, the initial
impact of tax reforms depends importantly on whether government services contribute to
private production. Remarkably, when government expenditures ﬁnance productive services,
gradually decreasing tax rates may be associated with decreasing growth rates in the short
2Moreoever, in developing economies, these agents often spend resources in order to escape taxation
altogether.
4run. This ﬁnding, in addition to the fact that transitions between balanced growth paths
may now be quite protracted, contrasts sharply with the implications of early endogenous
growth models. Unlike Stokey and Rebelo (1995), our analysis suggests that testing for
contemporaneous breaks in average growth cannot be used to identify the eﬀects of discrete
changes in tax policy.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy review previous cross-country
evidence on ﬁscal policy and economic growth. Section 3 introduces our modeling of pro-
gressive taxes, which stays constant across the diﬀerent frameworks we consider. Section 4
revisits Rebelo’s (1991) original endogenous growth model with progressive taxes and het-
erogeneous households. In section 5, we allow government expenditures to play a productive
role along the lines of Barro (1990). Section 6 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth in the Cross-
Section
Under the assumptions of proportional taxes and a representative agent, endogenous growth
models typically predict a negative correlation between growth, , and the ratio of public
spending to GDP,  . This negative correlation reﬂects the distortional eﬀects of taxation
in that, with proportional taxes,  = . While this prediction is a hallmark of the
endogenous growth literature, empirical cross-country growth studies have generally been
unable to conﬁrm this negative correlation.
Figures (1a) and (1b) illustrate this notion. Figure 1, panel (a) plots average per capita
growth rates versus taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital gains as a fraction of GDP across
107 countries over the period 1976-1997. Figure 1, panel (b) illustrates the link between
per-capita growth rates and the ratio of government expenditures to GDP for the same set
of countries. The measure of government spending in this case excludes expenditures on
public infrastructure (i.e., ﬁxed capital assets and land, as well as non-military and non-
ﬁnancial assets), which we do not model in this paper.3 The data are obtained from the
World Development Indicators published by the World Bank in 2000. If anything, the link
between per-capita growth rates and the relative size of public expenditures is increasing.
Figure 1, panels (c) and (d) illustrate the same relationships as in Figures (1a) and (1b) for
OECD countries only. In both cases the data fail to establish a negative link between the
relative size of government and per-capita output growth.4 Because neither the ﬁgures with
3As a fraction of GDP, public spending on infrastructure is typically small. Among OECD countries, for
instance, this ratio is at most 5 percent (Luxembourg).
4Levine and Renelt (1992) argue that this result continues to hold even when a wide range of conditioning
variables are taken into account, including initial income.
5tax revenue nor those with government expenditures imply a decreasing relationship with
output growth, we abstract from debt considerations below.
On a less equivocal note, Tanzi and Zee (2000) argue that the relative size of government
is actually higher for richer countries. They ﬁnd “that for the period 1985-1987, the average
total tax level in developing countries was about 175 percent of GDP. ... In contrast, the
average total tax level in OECD countries in the same period was more than twice as high
(366 percent of GDP), although there was signiﬁcant variance across the OECD subcountry
groups. Essentially all of the foregoing comparative observations are equally applicable to
t h et a xr e v e n u ed a t af o rt h ep e r i o d1995-1997.”
To account for these cross-sectional relations, the next sections explore the growth eﬀects
of progressive taxes in two prototypical endogenous growth models augmented to include a
non-degenerate distribution of income. These models, one ﬁrst formulated by Barro (1990)
and the other by Rebelo (1991), account for two polar assumptions regarding the use of
public expenditures. At one extreme, in Rebelo’s (1991) two-sector framework, government
spending does not play a productive role. At the other extreme, in the environment envi-
sioned by Barro (1990), all tax revenue serves to ﬁnance public services that enter as an
input into private production. In both cases, we show that long-run growth can increase
with the ratio of tax revenue to GDP as in the cross-section. In essence, the fact that taxes
are progressive now drives a wedge between the average marginal tax rate and the ratio of
tax revenue to GDP; the distortional eﬀects of higher marginal tax rates remain but cannot
be captured empirically with the latter ratio. Contrary to the original models, we also show
that changes in tax policy now induce protracted eﬀects on economic growth.
3 Progressive Taxation
We begin by describing the modeling of tax policy, which is common across the frameworks
we consider. The government balances its budget at each point in time and chooses a tax code
s u m m a r i z e db yt h et a xr a t e ,(	),w h e r e	 denotes household income and  is aggregate
income. Thus, the tax rate that applies to a given household depends only on its standing
in the economy. This modeling assumption ensures that not all households eventually face
the highest marginal tax rate simply as a result of economic growth. In other words, for the
purpose of this paper, we abstract from tax drift considerations.5 In the analysis below, we
5This phenomenon is also known as “bracket creep.” As part of the Cato Institute’s policy recommenda-
tions to the 106th U.S. Congress, Moore (1999) suggests that “real income bracket creep should be ended
by indexing tax brackets for inﬂation plus real income growth. ... In 1998, for example, worker incomes rose
by a respectable 6 percent, but tax receipts were up 10 percent. The primary culprit is real bracket creep.”
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where, similarly to Lansing and Guo (1998), the parameters 
 and 
 determine the level and
the slope of the tax schedule, respectively. When 
0, households with higher taxable
income are subject to higher tax rates, and the more common case of proportional taxes
corresponds to 
 =0 , (	)=
. In making decisions about how much to consume and
invest, households will take into account the particular way in which the tax schedule aﬀects
their earnings.
Given the tax rate in (1), (	)	 represents the total amount of taxes paid by a house-
hold with income 	. Because we wish to show the implications of progressivity for economic
growth, it is helpful to distinguish between average and marginal tax rates. In this case, as













where (	) is the tax rate applied to the last dollar earned. The average tax rate,
(	),i ss i m p l y(	).
While there exists no single appropriate way to deﬁne the degree of progressivity of a
tax schedule, one of the more widely used deﬁn i t i o n si se x p r e s s e di nt e r m so ft h er a t i oo f
the marginal to the average tax rate. Speciﬁcally, a statutory tax schedule is said to be
progressive whenever the marginal rate exceeds the average rate at all levels of income.6 In





so that the parameter 
 captures the degree of progressivity in the tax code. In the limit,
where 
 =0 , the tax schedule is “ﬂat” and (	)=(	). Other methods of measur-
ing progressivity involve the use of indices and attempt in part to capture the degree of tax
burden borne by households at diﬀerent income levels.7 A crucial problem here is that the
distribution of pre-tax income is endogenous and, therefore, expected to vary in response to
changes in statutory tax rates. To the extent that one is concerned with eﬀective progressiv-
ity, Creedy (1999) writes that “the tax structure alone is insuﬃcient to judge progressivity
because the overall eﬀect of a tax structure on the distribution of tax payments and the
inequality of net income cannot be assessed independently of the form of the distribution of
6See Musgrave and Musgrave (1989). Another way to deﬁne progressivity is to require that the average
tax rate be increasing over all income ranges, which is also satisﬁed in our framework.
7See, for instance, Kakwani (1977) and Suits (1977).
7pre-tax income.” In the models below, we shall illustrate how 
 directly inﬂuences both the
distribution of pre-tax income and economic growth.
While we summarize the tax code by equation (1) for simplicity, it can be diﬃcult in
practice to gauge the degree of statutory progressivity of a given tax schedule. Even absent
tax drift, such calculations involve sifting through the tax code and accounting for various
deductions to be netted out of gross income, determining the income tax rate that applies
to net income, and computing the credits deductible from the resultant tax liability. Sicat
and Virmani (1988) manage to work out marginal statutory tax rates at discrete income
levels for a number of low-income and middle-income countries. Their results show that
marginal tax rates on the highest bracket vary anywhere from 30 percent (Burkina Faso) to
95 percent (Tanzania) among the low-income countries alone. In contrast, the marginal tax
rate on the lowest bracket computed for the same set of countries varies only from 2 percent
to 20 percent. Although the authors do not publish estimated average tax schedules, their
ﬁndings are nevertheless suggestive of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in statutory progressivity across
economies.
In the U.S., the statutory income tax has undergone dramatic changes over the past two
decades following several important pieces of legislation. Most notable among these changes
i nt a xl a w sa r et h eE c o n o m i cR e c o v e r yT a xA c to f1981 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA-86). Important features of these two laws regarding individual income taxes
are as follows:
• According to the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO), ERTA “cut individual income
tax rates by a cumulative 25 percent over three years, dropping the top rate from 70
percent to 50 percent. ERTA also indexed tax brackets for inﬂation, reducing bracket
“creep” that subjected taxpayers to ever higher rates of inﬂation” (CBO [2001], p. 4).
• TRA-86 continued this trend, especially for high-income households. “Prior statutory
rates that had ranged as high as 50 percent were cut to just 15 and 28 percent. TRA-86
also increased the levels of the personal exemption and the standard deduction. The
act further changed the taxation of capital gains ... making the maximum rate on
long-term gains for top income earners 28 percent” (CBO [2001], p. 4).
Other changes in tax laws in the 1980s and early 1990s include the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1983, as well as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993. The
latter two acts somewhat raised marginal tax rates, but these changes generally did very
little to oﬀset the statutory eﬀects of the 1981 and 1986 acts (see Burman, Gale and Weiner
[1998]).
Interestingly, the U.S. tax reforms that generated sharp declines in maximum marginal
tax rates in the 1980s occurred in Sweden and the United Kingdom at about the same time.
8The top marginal rates were reduced from 75 to 50 p e r c e n ti nS w e d e nb e t w e e n1982 and
1985,a n df r o m80 to 40 percent in the United Kingdom between 1979 and 1988. In addition,
Bishop, Formby, and Zheng (1998) observe that as in the U.S., these changes in tax laws
were followed by rising pre-tax income inequality in both Sweden and the U.K.. For the
purpose of this paper, we shall interpret the wave of U.S. tax reforms as a gradual decrease
in statutory progressivity over ﬁve years (i.e., ERTA in 1981 and TRA-86). Consistent with
U.S. data, we shall show that, because a decrease in statutory progressivity gives rise to
more income inequality, it can also paradoxically lead to an increase in the eﬀective tax
share borne by high-income households.
4 Long-Run Policy and Long-Run Growth Revisited
This section modiﬁes Rebelo’s (1991) original linear endogenous growth model to account
for progressive taxes. For progressivity to play a redistributive role, we introduce a non-
degenerate distribution of income and wealth into the environment by assuming that house-
holds diﬀer in their rates of impatience. We adopt this method of inducing income hetero-
geneity mainly for tractability. There exists, however, substantial empirical work that links
diﬀerences in earnings and wealth to diverse rates of time preference.8 Ultimately, the re-
sults in this paper hinge on the fact that relatively wealthier agents may have an incentive to
increase their pre-tax earnings relative to aggregate income as the tax schedule becomes less
progressive. In principle, this channel would remain operative in models where heterogeneity
arises from other considerations, such as borrowing constraints as in Hugget (1993), Ayagari
(1994), and Rios-Rull (1995) among others, or permanent diﬀerences in productivity as in
Caucutt, Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2001).
Consider a closed economy populated by a large number of households uniformly dis-
tributed on [01].T h e r ea r e types of households, and each household type is indexed by
ad i s c o u n tf a c t o r,w h e r e0  1 ≤ 2 ≤   1. Thus, the most patient households
have discount factor . Within each group, the measure of households is given by 1.
Each household receives income from previous savings and a non-reproducible factor. The
quantity of the non-reproducible factor is denoted by  and is available in ﬁxed supply
in each time period (e.g., land). Income is either saved or used to purchase consumption
goods. Households are allowed to borrow and ﬁnance their debt out of wage income. Because
households face a progressive tax schedule, the most patient group will not end up owning
all available wealth in equilibrium.9
8See Hausman (1979), Lawrance (1991) for work using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Samwick
(1998) for an analysis using the Survey of Consumer Finances, as well as Warner and Pleeter (2001) for an
article based on the military drawdown program of the early 1990s.
9Below, we discuss the derivation of a non-degenerate equilibrium with constant long-run growth. The
9On the supply side, the economy remains exactly as in Rebelo (1991) and consists of
two production sectors. The ﬁrst sector produces investment goods, ,u s i n gaf r a c t i o n
1− of the available capital stock, , according to the linear technology  = (1−).
Here,  is to be interpreted as a reproducible composite capital good that includes both
human and physical capital and that can be accumulated over time. Speciﬁcally, +1 =
 +(1−),w h e r e0 1 is the capital depreciation rate. The second sector combines
the remaining capital stock, , with non-reproducible factors to produce consumption
goods, . Consumption goods are produced according to the Cobb-Douglas technology,
 = () 1−.
Each household of type  chooses paths for consumption, {}∞
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and   ≥ 0 for all  and  , 0  0 given for all .
We denote the price of consumption in terms of the composite capital good by .T h e
variables  and  denote the rates of return to capital and non-reproducible factors, re-
spectively. In solving their optimal consumption-investment allocation problem, households
take the sequence of prices {}∞
=0 and {}∞
=0 as given. Thus, the following Euler equation
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Firms make their production decisions to maximize proﬁts and solve max	 
	  (1 −
)+() 1−−−−,w h e r e =
P
=1 (1).O p t i m a lﬁrm behavior
implies that:
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 (8)
appendix then shows that existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium requires that there be enough




1− =  (9)
Total tax revenues are simply used to ﬁnance government expenditures on goods and














It can be easily shown that the above set-up implicitly deﬁnes an economy-wide resource
constraint.
4.1 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy is a set of prices {  },   =0 ∞, household alloca-
tions { },   =0 ∞,  =1 ,a n dﬁrms’ decision rules { },   =0 ∞,
such that given prices and the tax schedule (), i) households’ allocation decisions maximize
their lifetime utility, ii) ﬁrms’ decision rules maximize proﬁts, and iii) all markets clear.
We now turn to the description of a balanced growth equilibrium in which all individual
and aggregate variables, expressed in units of the composite capital good, eventually grow
at the same constant rate.10 In what follows, we denote the growth rate of variable " by
 = "+1".
Along a balanced growth path,  is constant and the relative price of consumption
increases at rate  = 
1−

 by equation (9). Given the production technology in the con-
sumption sector, we have that  = 

. Hence, when measured in units of the composite
capital good, aggregate consumption, , grows at rate  = 
.




=1 (1)+ = +.S i n c e
 +  = (1 − ) +() 1− −  by equations (7) and (8), substituting for
 in this last expression yields  = (1 − ) +( !) − . It follows that  = 

in the steady state.
Observe also that  =  −  using equations (7) and (9). The law of motion for capital
further implies that  = 
. To summarize, we have that  =  =  = 
;a n di t
remains only for us to describe how the growth rate of the composite capital good, 
,i s
determined in equilibrium.
Because individual and aggregate variables grow at the same rate in the long run, 	
in equation (6) is constant in the steady state. The left-hand side of this equation can
10Note that if individual variables grow at some constant rate, and their aggregate also grows at a constant
rate, then these rates must all be equal.





 and, since  i st h es a m ef o ra l l, individual consumption
increases at rate  = 

 in the long run. In this model, therefore, the balanced growth
rate, 
, and the relative distribution of income, as summarized by 	 for each ,a r e



































The following proposition provides suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a unique solution










[+1−],t h e n
an equilibrium with balanced growth, 
, and non-degenerate relative distribution of income,

 ≥ 0,  =1 , exists and is unique.
Proof: see Appendix.
The ﬁrst condition places an upper bound on the scale of the marginal tax schedule,
(	)=( 1+
)
(	), and ensures that households have suﬃcient incentive to invest
to sustain a balanced growth path. The second condition, while seemingly less intuitive,
holds when the degree of progressivity in the tax schedule, 
, is large enough relative to the
spread in discount factors 1  1. Hence, this second condition puts in enough curvature
in marginal tax rates to ensure that all households have non-negative relative income.11
Ac r u c i a ld i ﬀerence between this model and Rebelo’s (1991) original framework is that
tax reforms aﬀect both economic growth, 
, and the distribution of relative pre-tax in-






¢, are ultimately endogenous. In the original single agent set-up with pro-




 =  {(1 − )( − )+1 } (13)
with  being the constant marginal tax rate, could not possibly capture any feedback eﬀects
from economic growth to eﬀective tax rates. In interpreting their results, Easterly and Rebelo
(1993) explicitly recognized that this feature represented a serious caveat to their analysis.12
11As in Sarte (1997), a progressive tax schedule helps avoid the kind of degenerate equilibrium ﬁrst studied
by Becker (1980).
12The idea that changes in marginal tax rates has non-trivial eﬀects on the distribution of income in U.S.
data is developed extensively in Altig and Carlstrom (1999).
12Because households’ relative income responds to changes in progressivity in the environ-
ment, we consider the direction in which the share of tax revenue in output adjusts is not
immediately clear. Therefore, whatever the growth response, it may have been misleading
to look for evidence of a robust negative relationship between the size of government, as
measured by the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, and economic growth. In con-
trast, more conventional endogenous growth models with ﬂat rate taxes, where  = ,
necessarily predict a rise in  as  increases, and this rise is unambiguously accompanied
by a fall in the rate of growth by equation (13).
4.2 Intuition for the Steady State Eﬀects of Changes in Progres-
sivity
To understand the importance of progressivity for the cross-sectional relationship linking
growth and taxes, consider the eﬀects of a decrease in 
. For simplicity, let us focus on the
case where there are only two household groups: impatient households indexed by 1 and
patient households with discount rate 2  1.
Figure 2, panel (a) illustrates a typical equilibrium where 	1 and 	2 solve equation























for impatient and patient households, respectively. As expected, impatient households are
relatively poorer in the long run. At the initial equilibrium growth rate, 
,e q u a t i o n( 12)




 falls to 

0 in Figure 2, panel (b), so that the marginal tax rate decreases at
all levels of income. Because taxes are progressive, this downward shift entails a lighter tax
burden for the patient households at the initial solutions for 	1 and 	2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
faced with lower marginal tax rates, all households have an incentive to increase their relative
pre-tax earnings to 	0
1 and 	0
2, and this change is particularly pronounced for the more




represent an equilibrium distribution of relative income, since (12)
P2
=1(	0
)  1.H e n c e ,
i no r d e rt or e a c ht h en e ws t e a d ys t a t e ,t h eg r o w t hr a t em u s tr i s et o0

 in Figure 2, panel
(b), which induces the new distribution 	00
1 and 	00
2. We conclude that a decrease in 

leads to an increase in economic growth, slightly lower pre-tax relative income for impatient




Consistent with U.S. experience over the past two decades, the decrease in statutory rates
13coincides with an increase in pre-tax income inequality (i.e., [	1	2] ⊆ [	00
1	00
2])
and, therefore, a larger share of the tax burden potentially falling on high-income households.
The eﬀects of the adjustment mechanism we have just described are less straightforward
for the steady-state share of government expenditures, or tax revenue, in GDP. In our ex-
ample,  is initially given by (12)
P2
=1 
(	)1+. In response to the change in tax








1 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crease in progressivity, therefore, is ambiguous as patient and impatient households’ relative
earnings move in diﬀerent directions. It follows that, while 
 unambiguously rises in Figure
2b), the relationship between 
 and  may be much ﬂatter than originally suggested
by the early growth literature. In fact, if  also rises as the tax schedule becomes less
progressive, then diﬀerences in progressivity across economies would lead to an increasing
relationship between economic growth and the relative size of government.
4.3 Calibrated Examples and The Recent U.S. Experience
As indicated earlier, U.S. statutory marginal tax rates have fallen signiﬁcantly during the
past two decades, especially for high-income households. Over the same period, however,
the burden of individual income taxes has consistently shifted toward the highest income
households (see Figure 3). According to the CBO (2001), the top income quintile of house-
holds paid 78 percent of total individual income taxes in 1997, up from 66 percent in 1979.
By contrast, the next richest quintile bore only 15percent of total income tax liabilities in
1997 versus 20 percent 18 years earlier. Overall, the shifts in tax burden depicted in Figure
3 are consistent with a Tax Concentration Index (TCI) rising from 059 in 1979 to 068 in
1997.13 In eﬀective terms, therefore, progressivity has increased since the early 1980s.
The shifts in tax liabilities shown in Figure 3 are not entirely surprising, given the widely
documented increase in income inequality over the past 20 years. From 1979 to 1997, the
Census Bureau documents an increase of 006 in the Gini coeﬃcient of pre-tax income to
046. The Current Population Survey similarly estimates an increase of approximately 005
over the same period. Further, according to the CBO (2001), the rapid rise in the income of
richer taxpayers “has generated more than a proportional increase in federal tax revenues.
In turn, that increase has driven up the total eﬀective tax rate faster than income growth.”
There exist several possible explanations for the apparent increase in inequality, includ-
ing higher demand for skilled workers stemming from new technologies (Snower [1998]), and
changes in demographics (Bishop, Formby, and Smith [1997]). As Figure 2 suggests, we also
13Analogously to the Gini coeﬃcient, the Tax Concentration Index is a measure of the relative tax
burden borne by households at diﬀerent income levels and, in our framework, is deﬁned as  =











14expect that changes in tax laws aﬀected the distribution of pre-tax income in signiﬁcant ways.
Evidence of this channel from ERTA is presented in Lindsey (1987). Further evidence from
TRA-86 can be found in Feenberg and Poterba (1993), as well as Feldstein (1995). Feldstein,
in particular, estimates that for high-income groups, the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the net-of-tax rate may be high enough to generate a Laﬀer-type inverse revenue
response.14 Admittedly, Slemrod (1998) points to several potential methodological prob-
lems associated with the measurement and interpretation of taxable income. Furthermore,
in practice, increases in income inequality have likely been the result of a combination of
factors. However, to the extent that these factors include the ﬁscal reforms of the 1980s, our
framework allows us to quantify an upper bound for the growth eﬀects of progressive taxes.
With this in mind, we now turn to a numerical simulation of the recent U.S. experience.
4.3.1 Calibration to U.S. Benchmarks
The U.S. economy has grown at an average 18 percent in real terms since 1979 (i.e.  =
1018), and the following discussion assumes that we attempt to match this value in the
steady state. Households have log utility under our benchmark case,  =1 .F r o m t h e
capital accumulation equation, we have that  =  +( 1− ) along a balanced growth
path. Given that  =1 018, we follow Cooley and Prescott (1995) and choose  =0 058
to match a value of 0076 for . Using this value for , we calibrate  so that  =6 40
percent (Lucas [1990]). Since the real rate is simply  − , this immediately implies that
 =0 122.
Once  and  are calibrated, the technology for producing investment goods along with
the accumulation equation imply that 1 −  =
−(1−)
 ,o r =0 68.A si nR e b e l o ( 1991),
 =  +  −  so that, after substituting for ,  = [1 −  + !] − . Therefore,
given values of , ,a n d,w ec h o o s e! to match a capital output ratio of 332 (Cooley and
Prescott [1995]). This implies ! =0 16.
Finally, it remains to choose the scaling parameter in the tax schedule, 
,t h ed e g r e e
of progressivity, 1+
 = , and the discount factors, ,  =1 . We set these
parameters so as to match the share of government spending in output, approximately 20
percent, the per capita GDP growth rate, 18 percent (assumed in the above discussion),
and the quintile distribution of income in 1997.15 While labor is not modeled speciﬁcally in
Rebelo (1991), we choose to target total income rather than non-wage income because, in
that framework, endogenous growth emerges with a deﬁnition of capital that is broad enough
to include some human component. Therefore, the notion of income inequality here partly
14See Slemrod and Bakija (2000) for a survey of this literature.
15For consistency, all distributional measures below are taken from the same source, namely the CBO
(2001) study on eﬀective tax rates that covers 1979 to 1997.
15reﬂects diﬀerences in skill acquisition. The parameter values that achieve our calibration
targets are summarized in Table 1A. Speciﬁcally, 
 =0 17, 1+
 =1 68,a n d ranges
from 0963 to 0991. Surprisingly, relatively small diﬀerences in discount rates are needed to
reproduce the U.S. income quintile distribution.16
We report the main properties of our benchmark model economy and their data coun-
terparts in the second column of Table 2A. As shown in the table, the model, although
stylized, does well in reproducing the statistics our calibration set out to match. In addition,
our framework is also able to match tax-related statistics we had not explicitly targeted.
Table 2B shows that both the shares of individual tax liabilities and the after-tax income
distribution conform relatively well to the data. Since we abstract from income transfers
not implicitly reﬂected in the degree of progressivity, the share of total taxes paid by the
top income quintile in the model is slightly lower than its data counterpart. In particular,
observe that the lowest income quintile in the data bears a small negative tax burden.
4.3.2 Growth Eﬀe c t so fT a xR e f o r m si nt h eS t e a d yS t a t e
According to the Census Bureau, the U.S. Gini coeﬃcient of income rose by 006 between
1979 and 1997. To match a more equal distribution of income in 1979, with a Gini of 039,
our model requires that  =1 75 instead of 168 in the benchmark case. Recall from
Figure 2 that higher degrees of progressivity generate a more equal distribution of pre-tax
income. Therefore, to be consistent with lower income inequality in 1979, our model must
indeed feature the higher statutory marginal tax rates in eﬀect before the tax reforms of the
1980s.
With  =1 75, the model predicts a rate of output growth of 176 percent in 1979.
As expected, this rate is lower than the benchmark growth rate. Speciﬁcally, in this model,
the long-run eﬀects of policy changes in the 1980s amount to a diﬀerence of 013 percent. This
change, although not negligible as in Lucas (1990), is small enough that standard statistical
tests for breaks in time series would likely not detect it. Note that for the period spanning
1979 to 1997, the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth in the U.S. is roughly 193
percent. Hence, in terms of the U.S. experience, this ﬁnding is closer to those of Stokey and
Rebelo(1995) than to the large estimates provided by Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993).
Because a higher value for  in 1979 also implies less income inequality, the question
of shifts in individual tax liabilities immediately arises. On the one hand, a higher degree of
progressivity in 1979 suggests that the top income quintile might have paid a greater share of
total taxes at that time. On the other hand, lower income inequality in 1979 suggests exactly
the reverse. In fact, as in Figure 3, our framework predicts a lower share of tax liabilities
16Estimates of discount rates from the empirical literature imply values for  that range from 0
71 (Haus-
man [1979]) to 1 (Warner and Pleeter [2001]).
16for the top income quintile prior to the decrease in statutory rates. Thus, the ﬁfth income
quintile pays only 688 percent of total tax liabilities when  =1 75,w h i c hi s52 percent
lower than in the benchmark case. Furthermore, as in U.S. data, our model also predicts
a higher tax burden for the remaining four income quintiles prior to the tax reforms. The
fourth quintile contributes 165 percent of total taxes in our simulated 1979 economy versus
149 percent in 1997. Similarly, the third and second income quintiles bear, respectively, 16
and 13 percent more taxes when  =0 7517. These results underscore the point made
by Creedy (1999) in that more progressive statutory rates do not always translate into more
progressive eﬀective rates. Put another way, one cannot judge the progressivity eﬀects of a
statutory reform independently of the induced changes in the distribution of pre-tax income.
With the share of total taxes rising for the top income quintile as statutory rates fall,
the model-generated ratio of public expenditures to output is higher in our benchmark case,
202 percent, than prior to the decline in statutory rates, 193 percent when  =1 75.
Because the tax reforms also produce a small increase in economic growth, our framework
then points to an increasing relationship between the relative size of government and output
growth.
To illustrate the implication of this last ﬁnding for cross-country studies, we calibrate
 to reproduce the spread of pre-tax income Gini coeﬃcients across countries. In a
study of income inequality covering 80 countries, Deininger and Squire (1997) provide Gini
coeﬃcients ranging from 021 in the Slovak Republic to 062 in South Africa. Matching this
range while varying  produces panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4. Thus, changes in 
create up to a 1 percent cross-country variation in growth rates. Furthermore, Figure 4,
panel (b), which depicts a weakly increasing relationship between  and , stands as the
model analog to Figure 1, panels (a) through (d). Evidently, Figure (4b) also shows that if
accurate cross-country data on eﬀective marginal tax rates were obtained, one would indeed
expect a negative correlation between per capita output growth and average marginal tax
rates.18 Finally, Figure (4c) shows that changes in the scaling parameter, 
, calibrated to
match the range of cross-country Ginis predict a 25 percent divergence in economic growth.
This range represents approximately 20 percent of the full sample variation in growth rates
shown in Figure 1.T h e p o t e n t i a l g r o w t h e ﬀects of tax policy, therefore, are non-trivial
in the cross section. As illustrated in Figure (4d), the relationship between the share of
17For comparison, Figure 3 reveals that households in the top income quintile contributed 12 percent less
to total taxes in 1979. The remaining four quintiles paid between 1 and 4 percent more of aggregate taxes
in that year. Consequently, following the change in , our model predicts smaller shifts in tax liabilities for
the top two quintiles relative to the data. Not suprisingly, this suggests that over the last 20 years, income
inequality has increased at a rate faster than that implied by ﬁscal considerations alone (i.e. given a ﬁxed
, rising inequality would naturally lead to a greater share of tax liabilities for high-income households).




17government spending in GDP and output growth is now decreasing but, nevertheless, much
less pronounced than that between average marginal tax rates and output growth.
Thus far, an increase in progressivity that mimics the U.S. tax code prior to the reforms
of the 1980s is associated with both lower growth, , and a lower public spending share
in output,  . The latter eﬀect results from the perverse shift in tax liabilities. As a
normative experiment, observe that a rise in 
 meant to restore  to its benchmark value
necessarily increases the distortions associated with the tax schedule and, therefore, further
lowers economic growth. When  =1 75,av a l u eo f
 =0 183 is needed instead of 017
to keep the share of government spending in GDP at 20 percent. A161 rate of output growth
emerges under this alternative calibration, which represents a diﬀerence of 028 percent with
the benchmark case. This result amounts to roughly twice the diﬀerence in the growth eﬀect
induced by a change in  alone.
4.3.3 Tax Policy and the Dynamics of Economic Growth
The original environment described in Rebelo (1991) did not allow for transitional dynamics.
Recall from equation (13) that any change in the marginal tax rate would have been instan-
taneously reﬂected in a new steady-state growth rate. Once progressive taxes are introduced
into the environment, however, equation (4) shows explicitly that after-tax output exhibits
diminishing returns with respect to the composite capital good. Hence, because changes in
tax rates may now induce a long transitional period between balanced growth paths, testing
for breaks in average growth rates to identify the eﬀects of tax policy, as suggested in Stokey
and Rebelo (1995), may prove inappropriate.
To study the dynamics induced by a change in tax policy, we must ﬁrst transform our
economy’s variables so as to make them constant in the steady state. This is achieved
by normalizing each variable by the composite capital good, , except for consumption
variables, which we divide by 
 , and their relative price, which we normalize by 
1−
 .
This transformation deﬁnes a new set of state-like variables, ,  =1 .G i v e nt h e
size of our state space, we then linearize the dynamics of our transformed system around
its stationary equilibrium. The resulting set of linearized equations possesses a continuum
of solutions, but only one of these is consistent with the transversality condition for each
household type.
Figure 5 illustrates the growth eﬀects of a fall in  from 175 down to 168 evenly
divided over ﬁve years. The implied decrease in the tax schedule then captures the grad-
ual statutory changes introduced by ERTA and TRA-86 in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e1980s. In
Rebelo’s (1991) framework, we already saw that the long-run eﬀect of these reforms was to
increase economic growth 013 percent. Figure 5 panel (b), shows that the introduction of
progressive taxation also implies some transitional dynamics. However, the striking aspect of
18t h et r a n s i t i o nf r o mt h eo l dt ot h en e wb a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t hi st h a tm o s to ft h ea d j u s t m e n t
occurs contemporaneously. At the time of the shock, the balanced growth rate increases
roughly 012 percent. The growth rate continues to increase slightly as the tax schedule
gradually shifts down and then converges to a permanently higher steady state. Observe
that once the short-run growth eﬀects have taken place, the model implies substantial lags
in the adjustment process. Ultimately, however, there appears to be little diﬀerence between
the original representative agent formulation with ﬂat rate taxes and our model with hetero-
geneous households and progressive taxes. This is not the case in the next model we study,
a re-formulation of Barro’s (1990) environment where government services play a productive
role.
5 Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endoge-
nous Growth: New Implications
In the previous section, all tax proceeds were spent in a way that aﬀected neither the marginal
utility of private consumption nor the production possibilities of the private sector. We now
explore an alternative formulation, ﬁrst suggested by Barro (1990), in which tax revenue is
used to ﬁnance public services that contribute to private production.19 We modify this case
to incorporate progressive taxes and heterogeneous households for two reasons.
First, we show that the cross-sectional relationships in Figure 1 emerge even in this
set-up with growth-augmenting government services. In Barro’s initial representative agent
environment, the relation between growth and taxes tended to be that of an inverted U,
reﬂecting higher productive expenditures ﬁnanced by higher taxes on the one hand and the
distortional eﬀects of higher taxes on the other. In our framework, however, the relative
size of government expenditures,  , falls in the long run as progressivity increases; since
 also falls with , this explains why  increases with  in Figure 4, panel (b).
Therefore, as the marginal tax rate rises relative to the average rate in this new setting,
growth unambiguously falls not only because of the distortional eﬀects of taxes but also
because government contributions to private output are lower. Consequently, accounting for
non-linear taxation and heterogeneous households removes the familiar inverted U-shaped
relation between the share of government expenditures and output growth. In the end, the
cross-sectional implications of this environment, where the proceeds from taxation aﬀect
private-sector production, revert back to those of Section 4.
Second, while less progressive taxes raise output growth, the fact that taxes also ﬁnance
productive public services suggests that the favorable eﬀects of lower tax rates may be small
19See also Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), (1997).
19initially or even reversed. With non-linear taxes, a decrease in marginal rates motivated by
lower progressivity creates an endogenous adjustment in pre-tax income. In the long run, this
mechanism increases public expenditures by raising eﬀective tax revenue from high-income
households. In the short run, however, the income distribution adjustment is limited, and a
decrease in marginal rates simply reduces the level of productive public spending. It follows
that the growth eﬀects of a fall in progressivity may be quite muted initially.20 To illustrate
these ideas, we now turn to a more detailed description of the economic environment.
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where # denotes aggregate capital. As much as possible, we have attempted to keep the
notation in this and the previous section as in the original papers. We continue to think of
# as a composite capital good that includes both human and physical components. Total
government purchases at date   are represented by . For the purpose of this analysis,
we shall think of  as nonrival and nonexcludable and, therefore, abstract from congestion
considerations.21
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The household side of the economy remains essentially as in section 4. We describe the
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where 	 =  + Π,( 19)
and   ≥ 0 for all  and  , 0  0 given for all .
20Because Barro’s (1990) original framework models government services rather than public infrastructure,
the analysis cannot give rise to transitional dynamics without progressive taxation.
21See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) for a discussion of how congestion in public services can eliminate
scale eﬀects in economic growth.
20All households take the sequence of prices, {}∞
=0, and proﬁts, {Π}∞
=0,a sg i v e n ,a n dt h e
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The deﬁnition of equilibrium is analogous to that in section 4. Thus, we now describe
a balanced growth equilibrium in which all individual and aggregate variables grow at the
same constant rate, .
Along the balanced growth path, 	 is constant for each .E q u a t i o n( 2 1)i m p l i e st h a t





the steady state. Furthermore, by equation (17),  is constant and equal to !(#)
1−−.
Since the technology in (15) implies that (#)










In this model, therefore, an increase in public services relative to GDP unambiguously raises
the marginal product of capital.
In the end, we can think of long-run growth, , the long-run distribution of relative
pre-tax earnings, 	, and the size of government in the steady state,  ,a sb e i n g











































With public expenditures contributing to private production, the long-run eﬀects of
changes in progressivity can no longer be worked out in terms of a simple diagram as in
21Figure 2. The endogenous adjustment in the distribution of pre-tax earnings now aﬀects
economic growth not only directly, through the income tax rate, but also indirectly through
its impact on the relative size of public infrastructures. Furthermore, unlike the case with
ﬂat rate taxes originally explored by Barro (1990) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997),
these two channels must not necessarily oﬀset each other.
5.1 Long-Run Growth Eﬀects of Progressive Taxes
To explore the long-run eﬀects induced by changes in progressivity in this new environment,
we introduce once more an example calibrated to the U.S. We shall also use this example in
computing the transition between diﬀerent balanced growth paths.
5.1.1 Calibration
As in the previous section, households are assumed to have log utility in the benchmark
case. Given 18 percent growth in the steady state, we continue to set  =0 058 to match
a ratio of investment to capital of 0076 (recall that  = # +1− ). Empirical estimates
of 1−!, the elasticity of output with respect to government expenditures, vary signiﬁcantly
across studies. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) cite values ranging from as low as 003 (Eberts
[1986]) to as high as 039 (Aschauer [1989]). We set 1−! =0 25 to approximate a consensus
view. Conditional on matching the U.S. quintile distribution of income, we know from the
previous section that setting 1+
 =  =1 68 reproduces successfully the relative shares
of tax liabilities in 1997.
It remains to set the technological factor, , the scaling parameter in the tax schedule,

, and the discount factors ,  =1 . However, because we use an independent
estimate for ! and have already set 1+
, we now have more targets than free parameters
relative to our previous numerical example. In particular, we would like to continue matching
the remaining four statistics as well as the distribution of income in Table 2A. We choose
 =0 41, 
 =0 22, and set the discount factors between 0954 and 0997.T h e s e v a l u e s ,
shown in Table 1B, allow us to closely match per capita output growth, the share of public
spending in output, and the 1997 quintile distribution of pre-tax income. The capital-
output ratio that now emerges is somewhat higher than our target, but since the models
above assume a broad concept of capital, this may well be appropriate.
5.1.2 Steady-State Eﬀects with Productive Government Services
Similarly to section 4, an increase in  from 168 (our benchmark) to 175 is needed to
reproduce a Gini coeﬃcient of pre-tax income of 039 in 1979. This produces once more a
shift in tax liabilities where high-income households pay a smaller share of total taxes prior
22to the tax reforms of the 1980s. Speciﬁcally, the top income quintile contributes 70 percent
of aggregate taxes when  =1 75 versus 75 percent in the benchmark case.22
While changes in progressivity produce shifts in individual taxes that are similar to those
discussed in section 4, the implication of these shifts for growth are diﬀe r e n tt h a ni no u r
previous example. With  =1 75 in 1979, the model predicts an output growth rate
of 146 percent, 029 percent lower than when  =1 68. In Figure 5, panel (b), the
same change in  in Rebelo’s (1991) model generated less than half that diﬀerence in
the long run, 013 percent. The growth eﬀects of tax policy are more pronounced in this
case precisely because high-income households pay a smaller share of total taxes under the
more progressive rates in eﬀect before ERTA and TRA-86. The implied diﬀerence in tax
burden means a public spending share of only 20 percent in the 1979 economy compared
to 21 percent when  =1 68. By equation (22), this lower ratio of public services to
output lowers the return to investment independently of the conventional distortional eﬀects
of higher marginal tax rates.
On the whole, changes stemming from U.S. tax reforms in the 1980s continue to be
relatively modest. Furthermore, recall that they constitute only an upper bound in the sense
that the diﬀerence in  is calibrated to explain the entire change in Gini coeﬃcients
over the past two decades. Nevertheless, because diﬀerences in progressivity now aﬀect the
return to investment both directly (through more distortional marginal rates), and indirectly
(through changes in  ), we expect the model to predict a larger cross-sectional variation
in economic growth relative to those shown in Figure 4.
Figure 6, panels (a) and (b), illustrate the eﬀects of changes in  calibrated to
match the Deininger and Squire (1997) cross-country range of Gini coeﬃcients of income.
Note ﬁr s ti np a n e l( a )t h a td i ﬀerences in progressivity now create more than a 25 percent
divergence in cross-sectional output growth. This diﬀerence represents more than 20 percent
of the range in growth rates shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, because  also falls as
marginal tax rates increase relative to average rates, panel (b) continues to depict a slightly
rising relationship between GDP growth and the share of public spending in output. In this
context, therefore, the endogenous adjustments in pre-tax income and corresponding tax
liabilities undo the familiar inverted U-relationship that typically links  and  in this
class of models. Interestingly, Figure 6, panels (c) and (d), indicate that, within the range of
Gini coeﬃcients observed across countries, this inverted U-relation is no longer present even
when we vary the tax scaling parameter, 
.
We conclude that if there exist diﬀerences in tax progressivity across economies, whether
22At the same time, the lower four income quintiles bear between 0
5 and 1
6 percent more of total
tax liabilities before the changes in tax laws. Once again, therefore, more progressive statutory rates, as
exempliﬁed by 		 =1 
75, imply less progressive eﬀective rates.
23or not government expenditures contribute to private production is immaterial for the cross-
sectional correlation between economic growth and the ratio of public expenditures to output.
In either case, the upward shift in higher marginal tax rates implied by higher values of 

lowers output growth and  simultaneously. Should government services play a pro-
ductive role, the downward adjustment in  simply decreases economic growth further.
These results thus provide a theoretical foundation for the empirical ﬁndings of Levine and
Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos (1993), and Easterly and Rebelo (1991).
5.2 Dynamic Implications for Economic Growth
We saw in section 4 that the dynamics implied by progressive taxation did little to modify
the standard endogenous growth eﬀects of higher marginal tax rates. In particular, Figure 5
showed that most of the adjustment to the new balanced growth path in Rebelo’s framework
took place on impact. This is not the case when government spending plays a productive
role.
Figure 5 panel (b) shows that in Barro’s (1990) environment, a gradual decrease in 
from 175 to 168 over ﬁve years leads to a small increase in growth contemporaneously rel-
ative to the long run. The intuition underlying this result derives from the fact that the
distribution of relative pre-tax income, 	, adjusts gradually to a change in progressivity.
Therefore, on impact, the immediate eﬀect of a decrease in the tax schedule is to ﬁnance a
lower ratio of public services to GDP,  . Given the model’s assumptions, this decrease in
the relative size of government expenditures initially lowers the marginal product of capital
and, as a result, reduces the favorable growth eﬀects of lower marginal tax rates. More-
over, Figure 5, panel (b), shows that this eﬀect noticeably mutes the growth response to a
continuing fall in the ratio of marginal to average tax rates. Strikingly, the period of tax
reforms spanning years 2 through 5 associates declining statutory tax rates with essentially
ﬂat, or even decreasing, growth rates. Of course, in the long run, the more prosperous (i.e.,
patient) households have higher pre-tax income in relative terms. This eventual adjustment
implies more tax revenue relative to output and, consequently, more public services and
higher long-run growth.
The key point here is that the growth eﬀects of tax reform may not be monotonic over
time. Contrary to standard linear growth frameworks with ﬂat rate taxes, a permanent
decrease in marginal tax rates does not imply a corresponding and permanent rise in economic
growth contemporaneously. Observe in Figure 5 (b) that the transition to a higher balanced
growth path suggests signiﬁcant lags in the eﬀects of tax changes on output growth.
To identify the growth eﬀects of tax policy in the U.S., Stokey and Rebelo (1995) suggest
testing for breaks in the average value of per capita output growth. The transitional dynamics
of Barro’s model, however, imply that this strategy may be inappropriate for two reasons.
24First, the magnitudes involved in Figure 5, panel (b) are small relative to average variations
in the time series of U.S. output growth. Second, even in a situation where a country
adopted tax reforms drastic enough to cause a signiﬁc a n ts h i f ti nb a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t h s ,
Barro’s framework shows very little change on impact and a slow convergence to the steady
state. In the end, our analysis indicates that the history of U.S. growth and tax changes over
the last 20 years is not necessarily at odds with standard endogenous growth frameworks.
Evidently, as in Figure 6, this does not prohibit variations in tax policies across countries
from leading to notable diﬀerences in growth rates.
6 Summary and Conclusions
With the advent of the endogenous growth framework, it became theoretically possible to
address some of the cross-country dispersion in average growth rates in terms of diﬀerences
in public policy. Unfortunately, early endogenous growth models, of the type posited by
Jones and Manuelli (1990), or Rebelo (1991), were later shown to be at odds with the data.
Above all, these models implied that economic growth should fall with the size of government
spending and tax revenue relative to GDP.
In this paper, we have attempted to show that allowing for progressive taxes and house-
hold heterogeneity in standard growth models considerably changes their predictions both
in the cross-section and the time series. In the economies presented above, a decrease in
tax progressivity did lead to higher growth. However, the endogenous adjustment in the
distribution of pre-tax income prevented this policy change from yielding lower tax revenues
as a fraction of GDP. When plotted against each other, both of these results seemed to
match well with available cross-country evidence. Our calibrated examples suggested that
diﬀerences in tax code across countries could explain up to a two and half percent variation
in economic growth.
We also showed that the explicit modeling of non-linear taxes implied important lags in
the eﬀects of tax policy on per capita output growth. In the case where public spending
served as an input into private production, we found that the favorable growth eﬀects of lower
marginal tax rates could be signiﬁcantly muted in the short run. Remarkably, our calibrated
example indicated that a decreasing tax schedule could be associated with ﬂat, or even
decreasing, growth rates in the short run. Finally, our analysis suggested that considerable
changes in U.S. tax laws between 1981 and 1986 contributed at most 029 percent to per
capita GDP growth. This ﬁnding sheds doubt on the ability to use tax policy to signiﬁcantly
alter prospects for long-run U.S. economic growth.
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Now deﬁne the left-hand side of (A2) as $(
). There are two cases to consider, namely,
1 − !(1 − ) ≥ 0 and 1 − !(1 − )  0.
Suppose ﬁrst that 1 − !(1 − ) ≥ 0. Since we allow for 
1, the expression inside the
square brackets of equation (A1)c a n n o tb en e g a t i v e .D e ﬁne 











1 ≥ 0 and, since 1 is the smallest discount rate,





  0 for  =2 . Hence, $(
) is always well deﬁned for 
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In other words, 
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follows that $(e 
)  1.
Since $(
) is continuous, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists 0  
  e 

such that $(
)=1 . In addition, because $(
) falls monotonically with 
, this solution
i su n i q u e( s e eF i g u r e7 ) .
It remains to check that e 
 falls within the domain of feasible growth rates, e 
 ≤ 
.







[ +1− ] (i.e. condition (ii) above)
ensures that this will indeed be the case. Given the solution for 
, one can then solve for
the distribution of relative income, 	 for each ,b ys i m p l yu s i n g( A 1) .T h ec a s ew h e r e
1 − !(1 − )  1 can be worked out in a similar fashion.¤
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30Table 1. Calibrated Benchmark Parameters
A. Parameters in Rebelo (1991) Value
Preferences
 Intertemporal Elasticity of 1
Substitution
 Time Discount Rates
h
0963 0968 0970 0975 0991
i
Technology
 Capital Depreciation Rate 0058
 Technological Scalar 012
! Elasticity of Consumption Sector 016
Output with respect to Capital
Tax Policy

 Scalar in Tax Schedule 017
1+
 Ratio of Marginal to Average 168
Tax Rate
31Table 1. Calibrated Benchmark Parameters
B. Parameters in Barro (1990) Value
Preferences
 Intertemporal Elasticity of 1
Substitution
 Time Discount Rates
h
0954 0960 0964 0971 0997
i
Technology
 Capital Depreciation Rate 0058
 Technological Scalar 041
1 − ! Elasticity of Output with 025
respect to Government Services
Tax Policy

 Scalar in Tax Schedule 022
1+
 Ratio of Marginal to Average 168
Tax Rate
32Table 2. Benchmark Model Economies
A. Targeted Statistics U.S. Data Rebelo (1991) Barro (1990)
Growth Rate (%) 1.80 1.89 1.75
Real Rate (%) 6.40 6.40 7.50
Investment/Capital 0.076 0.077 0.075
Capital/Output 3.32 3.41 5.60
Government Expenditures/Output (%) 20 20.172 1.19
Quintile Distribution of Income (%)
Highest Quintile 53.2 53.8 54.3
Fourth Quintile 20.2 20.7 20.0
Third Quintile 13.9 13.0 12.9
Second Quintile 9.0 8.8 8.9
First Quintile 4.0 3.6 3.8
B. Other Statistics
Gini Coeﬃcient of Pre-Tax Income 0.46 0.45 0.45
Share of Individual Tax Liabilities
(% by Income Quintile)
Highest Quintile 77.9 73.8 74.7
Fourth Quintile 14.8 14.9 141.1
Third Quintile 7.1 6.9 6.8
Second Quintile 2.0 3.5 3.6
First Quintile -1.8 0.8 0.9
After-Tax Income Distribution (%)
Highest Quintile 49.8 47.4 45.0
Fourth Quintile 20.8 22.6 22.8
Third Quintile 14.8 15.0 15.8
Second Quintile 10.11 0.4 11.4
First Quintile 4.9 4.5 5.1
Note: The U.S. quintile distributions of pre-tax and after-tax income are obtained from
Table G-1c in CBO (2001). The shares of individual income tax liabilities are obtained from
Table G-1b.
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c. Taxes on Income, Profits, and Capital Gains (% of GDP) 
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